On March 24th, around 20.00 local time first bombs and missiles struck FR Yugoslavia, signaling the start of NATO aggression - 'Operation Allied force' as NATO like to call it..
NATO stated their aim's are to:
- prevent humanitarian disaster,
- put pressure on Yugoslavia to accept of the Rambouillet Accords.
- United Nation Statute by attacking FRY without any UN resolution allowing them to use force. Further more Yugoslavia didn't make treats or attacks on any other country,
- NATO Founding Act that states NATO mission is protection of member countries. No country was under attack by Yugoslavia,
- Wienna Convention forbidding one state to use military force to compel other state to sign an international agreement.
When NATO bomb's started to fall around and KLA (UCK) attacked (trying to take their chance) causing ground fightings all the civilian affected fled from their homes.
Defense War
The March 24th attack came after months of open threats to FRY so VJ was on alert. Following an order from the YU AF commander, General Spasoje Smiljanic, issued on February 15, 1999 several units were relocated, in preparation for possible war. Mobilization was set in train, sites for radar and AD missile systems were selected and surveyed, and vital equipment was stored on secret locations. Up to the beginning of the war, on March 24th, 1999 90% of material reserves and 70 % of the RV i PVO equipment had been moved from their peacetime locations. Aircraft were moved to hardened aircraft shelters and helicopters were flown camouflaged reserve airfields away from their home bases.
Air defense forces were grouped in three zones around the largest cities in Central Serbia, as well as in Vojvodina and Kososvo province.
Yugoslavia AF faced the NATO air campaign with 154 aircraft, of which only some 40 fighters and 40 fighter-bombers were fully serviceable and combat-capable, but only 14 MiG-29 fighters had any realistic combat value. Since the armament of the RV i PVO was considered obsolete for the conduct of warfare against an enemy using advanced technologies, the most important task was to protect personnel and equipment from massive losses.
NATO had approximately 365 aircraft and Fosch carrier available for Operation "Allied Force". The countries sending their planes are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.
First night
NATO strikes first began to fall on Pristina, the capital of Kosovo and Metohija province, at approximately 8.00pm. A minutes later Belgrade, capital of FRY, was targeted.
The first wave included some 70 NATO warplanes, flying 156 sorties against 40 targets (mostly IAD - Integrated Air Defense sites) throughout Yugoslavia.
At 6.50pm (5.50pm GMT) the US navy Ticonderoga-class cruiser, USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) launched the first of a volley of Tomahawk Land-attack Cruise Missiles (T-LAM) toward the Adriatic coast. Within minutes, three destroyers, including the Arleigh Burke-class USS Gonazales (DDG 66), and Spruance-class USS Nicholson (DD 982) and USS Thorn (DD 982), had joined in, along with two US Navy submarines, the Los Angeles-class (Improved) USS Miami (SSN 755) and Los Angeles-class USS Norfolk (SSN 714). In addition, the British submarine HMS Splendid (S 106), made history by being the first Royal Navy ship to fire a UGM-109 submarine-launched Tomahawk in combat.
At about the same time, six of the eight American B-52Hs, which had taken off from RAF Fairford at 10.45am (GMT), reached their launch points over Adriatic Sea. An unarmed decoy and another 'spare' plane had already turned back after reaching the Mediterranean. The strike mission for this first night dictated that only six aircraft need to launch their AGM-86C Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM). A B-52 call-sign 'Havoc-12', from the 20th Bomb Squadron, home-based at Barksdale, was the first to fire AGM-86C in the war. USAF have had a lot trouble with the missiles and on this occasion they were able to launch only 27 of them. Aircraft 'Havoc-11' had trouble with two of its missiles. 'Havoc-12' then had to scramble to take its place and reload new computer data tapes into the missiles' computer memories. Even with all of this effort, 'Havoc-12', only managed to launch five of its eight missiles (they carry only eight-only internally, to protect them from environment). On the third night over Kosovo, one B-52 had failures in six of its eight missiles.
It is estimated that out of 100 cruise missiles fired in the first week some 30 were CALCMs. That left only ~100 in USAF inventory, so Boeing is now converting 322 nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missiles to non-nuclear CALCM AGM-86C Block 1 and Block 1A configurations for the U.S. Air Force.
Also, at least one of Navys Tomahawk missiles failed shortly after launch and spalshed harmessly into the Adriatic.
After the cruise missile strike NATO aircraft started to poor over Yugoslavian borders with Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Hungary.
Two B-2A Spirit stealth bombers of the 509th Bomb Wing, using the call-sign 'Dart' (Vader), flew the type's first combat sortie in a 31-hour round-trip Global Power mission originating from their home base at Whitman AFB, Missouri. In fact, they made history twice in one go by also being the first aircraft to drop the GBU-29/30 2,000 lb Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) in combat. B-2 flow total of 45 missions and launched 656 JDAM's.
During the "Allied Force" operation NATO launched 218 TLAM-C/-D from 6 US Navy vessels, 2 US and one UK submarine.
First Yugoslav planes in the air were "Knights" from 127. lae with their MiG-29 (only unit operating them). From 7.00PM pilots were given "Pripravnost 1" (Alert 1), which means they were sitting in the cockpit waiting orders.
Two MiG's were scrambled from Batajnica, near Belgrade. Almost immediately after launch from Batajnica British E-3D Sentry AWACS command and control aircraft picked them and advised 4 Dutch F-16AM. They were the first to cross into Yugoslavia as fighter escorts. AM marks that they had Mid-Life Update applied which added all-weather, night and BVR capability with AIM-120 AMRAAM. All four F-16 picked Major's Nebojљa Nikolić MiG-29, serial 18111, on radar and pursued it, with lead aircraft firing AIM-120 head-on. It was a direct hit, with pilot ejecting safely. The other MiG-29, serial 18106 with Major Predrag Milutinović in cocpit, was shot down by a USAF F-15C.
Two MiG's were scrambled from Nis airport. Major Aljo Arizanov aircraft, serial 18112, was destoyed by F-15C and Potpukovnik Dragan Ilić managed to land badly damaged.
Since Germany had the same type of MiG-29 for a decade NATO was expected to be successful in jamming radar and communication with GC center. Bearing that in mind and the fact of great numbers of enemy aircraft in the air backed by 4 AWACS Yugoslav pilots applied new tactics. They abandoned usual leader-wingman formations and used fast solo dashes near ground to stay out of sight and than, when close enough to fire R-73 (AA-11), vertical climb trying to get firing solution with KOLS laser - IR rangefinder/homing system.
Locally produced J-22 Orao fighter-bombers from 241. lbae in Ladjevci, near Kraljevo, were next to be scramled.Since they have no radar nor AA missiles they were used to shotdown cruise missiles with their cannons. Potpukovnik Ћivota Đurić, comander of the 241. lbae Tigers, tried to ram his Orao into the attackers after being hit.
F-15C from 48th FW/USAF based at Lakenheath was forced to make an emergrncy landing at Srajevo airport due to "unspecified engine trouble".
On the 26th, MiG-29 flown by Kapetan (Captain) Zoran Radosavljević was shot down and killed, with airplane crashed in Bosnia. His wingman Potpukovnik Slobodan Perić was also shot down.
MiG 18109 flown by, Colonel Milenko Pavlović commander of 127. LAE squadron was shot down on 4 May 1999 by a F-15C.
A total of four Yugoslav MiG-29s were destroyed by AMRAAM missiles in aerial combat, two pilots were killed and two successfully ejected from their stricken aircraft. Two more pilots ejected from MiG-29s that had been hit under inexplicable circumstances, officially downed by NATO, but there is a good chance that they were victims of friendly fire.
Five more MiG-29s were destroyed on the ground.
Three squadrons that were equipped with MiG-21 did not carry any combat missions, but suffered heavy losses from air strikes while dispersed on various airfields. 83rd Regiment had 37 MiG-21bis Fish bed L/Ns and MiG-21UM Mongol-Bs in two squadrons (123.lae and 124.lae). Only 11 aircraft based on Slatina, Priљtina airfield survived the war inside the under ground hangars.
5 pilots, that were scrambled on the first couple of days, were awarded Bravery Medals, one got Medal of Honor and two got Distinguished Service Medal.
F-117A Down
ADF used their weapons very selectively. They turn on their air defense system in order to engage only when a chances for a hit are good. After every launch units move to new locations. A great numbers of NATO missile were destroyed in the air by shoulder launched missiles.
For the detection of strike packages at long range, the RV i PVO relied on AN/TPS-70 radars bought from the USA in 1982. Also, older S-600 radars bought from UK was used for the same task. The safety of radar operating crews was increased by dispersing them in special shelters located several dozens of feet away from the radar head.
Completely obsolete Soviet P-12 "Spoon Rest A" and P-18 "Spoon Rest D" radars had been pulled out of the war reserves and were used to supplement the modern radars. The old radars worked in decimeter and metric frequency ranges, which were incompatible with the homing heads of HARM and ALARM anti-radiation missiles. Missiles fired by SEAD packages were falling several hundreds of feet away from radars since they could not locate the precise position of transmitting antennas. Additionally, the older radars created their beam by reflection of electro radiation of the surrounding terrain, which completely confused the sophisticated sensor of the NATO fighters. This method of surveillance allowed the use of obsolete AD radar systems against aircraft employing advanced stealth technology.
NATO laid out a comprehensive, multistage plan, the first stage of which called for neutralization of Yugoslavia’s air defenses. Several weeks into the conflict NATO was forced to scrap this plan. After a press conference, during which NATO officials announced that they are comfortable with the way Yugoslav air defenses were suppressed, the unthinkable happened: United States Air Force lost one of its F-117A Nighthawk stealth bombers on March 27th. The pilot was rescued by 21st Special Operations Squadron/352 Special Operation Group based at Tuzla (that's in Bosnia were one could find SFOR "peacekeepers"). The CSAR mission was executed by eight helicopters led by two MH-53J Pave Low III, with top cover from four F-16 and two F-15s.
F-117A was downed by the most successful air defense unit, the 3rd Battalion of the 250th Missile Brigade, equipped with the Neva-M (SA-3 Goa). The same unit also hit and badly damaged one more F-117A on May 1st, whilst a USAF F-16C Fighting Falcon was destroyed on May 2nd.
Quantity and efficiency of Air Defense network, and the incapacity of NATO to abolish it completely, led the Allies to require their aircrews to operate above or around 16 000 ft (4 875 m).
During the first months all operation above 44 North latitude were for the Americans.
Not a single NATO aircraft, even B-2 and F-117A, was allowed to theater of operation without SEAD escort.
Although decoy radar emitters were used extensively by the RV i PVO, around two-thirds of its radars were hit during NATO air strikes. The radars were kept on right up to moment when NATO aircraft entered YU air space, when they were turned of to avoid detection, but the larger stationary installations could not be moved quickly and therefore became easy victims of the attacking aircraft.
The 126th Brigade compensated for its losses by introduction surveillance radars from the Army and Navy, as well as from civilian meteorological stations.
More weapons
On April 1st, five B-1B Lancers arrived at RAF Fairford making it the first time since WW II that any air force has fielded three heavy bombers all in same campaign. In another "historic milestone" they carried the new CBU-97 Sensor-Fused Weapon into combat.
On April 6th, USAF F-15E Strike Eagle dropped 5,000 lb (2268 kg) GBU-28 'bunker-buster' on a tunnel near Slatina airfield.
On April 24 RAF Harrier GR.7 dropped their first two 2,000 lb Paveway III PGM on a road bridge.
AD mobile radar are used for a very limited period of time, following which they are disengaged and relocated. I personally witnessed in operation stationary system S-125 NEVA (SA-3) on a field near Belgrade on sixtieth day of the war
During the 78 days Yugoslav ADF fired 673 SAM's [ as yet unconfirmed open sources suggest that VJ fired 106 man-portable, 126 unidentified, 175 SA-3 and 266 SA-6 surface-to-air missiles at NATO aircraft flying `Allied Force' missions]
With no means to acquire new military hardware Yugoslav engineers were forced to improvise and use existing stock of weapons in a new fashion. So far available details are about:
- R-60 AA missile first time use as SAM missile. The missile was mounted on the chassis of a M55A3B1 towed anti-aircraft gun. Weapon pylons removed from fighter aircraft were used to launch the missile. The R-60 missile uses IR guidance and does not require a radar or any complex peripheral systems for operation.
- R-73 AA missile mounted on Czech-made Praga's M53/59 mobile AAA with two 30mm cannons. The cannons were replaced by R-73
All units showed impressing mobility and high standard of electronic silence. Military commanders skillfully managed their mobile air defense assets and used older and weather radars (at first they fired HARM only on AD radars but when F-117 was shot down they started firing at first "red lamp" of their RWR - they even fired one HARM on Bulgarian capital Sofia which is 50 km from Yugoslavias border) as decoys to distract a significant portion of NATO’s resources. In addition to these difficulties, NATO had to restrict its aircraft primarily to high-altitude missions in order to avoid innumerable mobile AAA batteries and man-portable SAMs. This made targeting of Yugoslav mobile military equipment extremely difficult.NATO had almost impossible mission to locate their targets. Stand-off surveillance proved ineffective thanks to excellent camouflage and constant relocation so UAV were only means of reliable reconnaissance. On the other hand UAV proved easy prey for AD. VJ even used M-84 machineguns, fired from Mi-8 helicopters, to destroy UAV's.
Yugoslav Air Defense, alto armed with 20 or so years old missiles and guns, forced NATO aircraft to fly above 15 000 ft (4 500m), thus preventing them from successful interdiction mission |
- fly its strike missions at higher altitudes to reduce risk;
- fly thousands of dedicated suppression missions, pushing its EA-6B force in Europe to its limits;
- keep many low-flying aircraft, such as the Army’s Apache attack helicopters, out of combat.
Fighter-bomber units of the RV i PVO were ordered to undertake combat operations over Kosovo and Metohija Province, the targets being various positions and concentrations of Albanian rebel forces. This kind of mission was not carried out prior to the commencement to NATO air campaign, in order to avoid inviting reprisal from the western nations.
Once, the conflict got under way J-22 Orao and G-4 Super Galeb light attack fighters joined the fray. These aircraft operated from aircraft located in Central Serbia, such as Ladjevci, Obrva, Ponikve, Uzice and Nis, flying to their designated targets at extremely low level to avoid detections by NATO and USAF AWACS aircraft. In the target area pilots pulled up to a several hundred feet, quickly located the target and executed the attack. They returned to their respective deployment basses at the lowest possible altitude at high speed, with strictly observed radio silence in order to avoid detection by SIGINT aircraft flying in the area.
Because of the secrecy of these missions, orders to regiment and squadron commanders were given directly by Major-General Radoljub Masic, the Aviation Corps commander and Major-General Mile Filipovic. They were identified over the telephone and in radio communication by their voices, which were familiar to their subordinated officers. This subterfuge was successful and not a single aircraft was intercepted, even though some missions were carried out only a few miles from the areas of operations of NATO combat aircraft
Pilots who flew this missions said their radar warning receivers showed that they were illuminated by enemy radars only when they were negotiated mountain peaks.
RV i PVO's fighter-bomber force indolent lasted ten days. Further operations were halted after NATO forces attacked and damaged runway's at fighter-bombers operating basses. From that moment aircraft were kept on hidden locations to be ready for use against possible NATO ground invasion.
Reconnaissance aircraft (MiG-21R and IJ-22 Orao) played an important role in collecting intelligence about NATO and Albanian forces. There were flights deep inside the territory of neighboring countries on photo and probable SIGINT sorties. On one such sortie, Western journalist observed two IJ-22 launching flares during a low-level flight over the city of Tropoja in north of Albania.
Helicopter squadrons limited their involvement to the transportation of casualties to the hospitals and emergency deliveries of ammunition and food to forward position and garrisons. Mi-8s were used on high-risk missions for the delivery of food to border switchovers in the mountains, at altitudes of around 2000 m above sea level. To avoid detection that flew at nap-of-the-earth frequently changing speed and directions.
Transport aviation played important part in war preparations, with An-26 used extensively for deployment of reserve forces. On the first morning of the war all serviceable of the 677th Transport Squadron aircraft flew low level to Beograd and Ecka civil airport were remained to the end of the conflict. On March 26th a single An-26 carried a special mission (probably reconnaissance or intelligence gathering) between Beograd and Podgorica for which the crew was later decorated.
If you can't hit tanks...
NATO started with 365 aircraft, and after a 78 days has over 1000 but was still unable successful interdiction missions over Kosovo and Metohija to destroy ground forces.
In the first weeks NATO attacked from north, west and south but than Romania and Bulgaria allowed their airspace to be used so Yugoslavia was totally encircled with NATO "puppets" and bombed from all directions. Yugoslavia and Romania even signed a pact of "partnership" that states "no country will attack other country nor allow their soil to be used for attack on other country".
VJ managed to stay in control on the ground and to effectively destroy KLA (UCK) positions which were built under OSCE monitors supervision that prevented security forces from dealing with them. Even after numerous aerial support from NATO OVK forces trained and equipped in Albania weren't able to penetrate defense lines along the border and to advance in Yugoslavia. In May NATO started carpet bombing with either 500 lb (227 kg) Mk 82, 2000 lb (907) Mk 84 bombs or a mixture of both. The were droped from B-52's and B-1B's flying at 40 000 ft (12 192 m) alongside Yugoslavia-Albania border supporting OVK forces. Both bombers used Raytheon AN/ALE-50 fibre-optic towed repeater jammers and decoys.
During the campaign, the USAF deployed its AN/ALE-50 decoy aboard F-16 multirole combat aircraft and B-1 strategic bombers. During the campaign, as yet unconfirmed open sources suggest that the Serbs fired 106 man-portable, 126 unidentified, 175 SA-3 and 266 SA-6 surface-to-air missiles at NATO aircraft flying `Allied Force' missions. Of these, at least 125 were aimed at the five participating B-1B bombers, four of which were equipped with ALE-50. Use of the decoy is reported to have saved ALE-50 equipped B-1Bs in up to 10 engagements.
The efectivnes of AD forced NATO to scrap plans of sending AH-64 over Yugoslavia even they were loudly presented as "VJ worst nightmare". Out of 24 Apache's two crash in Albania "after technical failure".
With only limited damage on VJ units NATO started bombing of civilians target after 4 weeks of their campaign. They destroyed numerous factories, bridges and other infrastructure and industrial target.
NATO worst crime againts civilians is attacks on electrical power infrastructure. On their first attack they used BLU-114/B, a special-purpose munitions. This highly classified weapon, functions by dispensing a number of submunitions which in turn disperse large numbers of chemically treated carbon graphite filaments which short-circuit electrical power distribution equipment such as transformers and switching stations.This previously undisclosed weapon, carried by the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter, was used for the first time on 02 May 1999. Following these attacks lights went out over 70 per cent of the country. All hospitals, bread making facilities, water pumping stations were left without power. After first strike in took 7 hours to restore power for priorities and 20 hours for the rest of the country.
| Yugoslav AF sorties during the war | ||||||
| Aircraft type | Combat missions | Transport missions | Other missions | |||
| Flights | Hours [h.min] | Flights | Hours [h.min] | Flights | Hours [h.min] | |
| Fighters | 11 | 5.10 | / | / | 8 | 3.55 |
| Fighter-bombers | 25 | 15.25 | / | / | 6 | 3.00 |
| Helicopters | / | / | 104 [carried 113 passengers and 5 t] | 59.15 | 75 | 29.55 |
| Transport Aviation | / | / | 2 [carried 113 passengers and 5 t] | 2.00 | 17 | 3.40 |
| Total | 36 | 20.35 | 106 | 61.15 | 106 | 40.30 |
Total of 248 sorties were flown in duration of 122.20 hours | ||||||
However, after third time we got power back only in 5 hours, so NATO changed tactics. They started, on May 21, throwing cluster bombs on transformator stations, thus destroying electrical power infrastructure. This is the "right way", by NATO, to stop "humanitarian disaster" by sending Yugoslav's to stone age without electricity and running water (water pumps run on electrical power).
Some of the worst misdeed's are:
- destruction of Pristina (capital of Kosovo and Metohija) central area
- destruction of entire block in city Aleksinac (18 dead civilians, 40 wounded)
- bombing of passenger train near Leskovac (~40 dead, 17 missing)
- bombing of Albanian refuge convoy (75 dead, 26 wounded)
- destroying of a heating plant in Belgrade
- bombing of "Usce" business center in Belgrade
- destruction of refuge camp near Kursumlija (10 dead civilians,numerous wounded)
- numeorus bombing runs on Kursumlija
- destruction of refuge camp near Djakovica (5 dead civilians,21 wounded)
- destroying of a tobacco plant in Nis
- bombing of national TV stations headquarters in Belgrade (10 dead, 20 missing, 17 wounded)
- destruction of entire block in Surdulica (16 dead civilians, numerous wounded)
- bombing of inter-city bus (23 dead civilians, 40 wounded and 47 dead, 16 wounded on second occasion)
- bombing of city Nis with cluster bombs in midday (14 dead, numerous wounded)
- bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade(4 dead, more than 10 wounded)
- bombing of Hotel "Jugoslavija" in center of Belgrade (1 guest dead)
- bombing of Albanian refuge convoy in village Kosare (87 dead, ~100 wounded)- USAF F-16 responsible
- bombing of "Dr Dragisa Misovic" clinical centar in Belgrade (4 dead patients, numerous patient's and medical staff wounded)
- bombing of State Penitentionary in Istok (approximately 100 dead guards and prisoners, more than 200 wounde)
- bombing of a news convoy (one driver dead, 2 reporters wounded)
- bombing of a bridge in Varvarin in midday (11 dead, 35 wounded)
- destruction of entire block in Novi Pazar (23 dead civilians, 20 wounded)
- bombing of a hospital in Surdulica (19 dead patients, 40 wounded)
| The following is an excerpt from "Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 2000-2001 Market Review" by Tony Cullen, Christopher F Foss; Jane's, November 2000"The last year of the millennium was also the time when the mystique associated with the combat operation of the invulnerable Stealth aircraft was shattered. During yet another regional conflict against a pariah state and over an 11 week period in the Spring, the Yugoslavian Republic of Serbia and Montenegro together with its Kosovan enclave were subjected to the might of NATO's air power. Despite this the Yugoslavian air defences, by what is believed to be a judicious combination of air defence systems and radars, managed on 27 March to shoot down a Lockheed Martin F-117A Nighthawk Stealth Fighter. Admittedly, although only one other aircraft, a Lockheed Martin F-16, and a moderate number of various allied Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were also lost to the air defences, a number of other aircraft were also damaged by air defence fire, including it is believed a second F-117A. Despite this relatively low NATO attrition rate it should be recognised that despite a massive Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) campaign the use of Information Warfare tactics by the USA to infiltrate and degrade Yugoslavian battle management systems and their computers, and the introduction of the latest lethal and non-lethal air-to-ground weaponry the Yugoslavs could have rapidly reconstituted their air defence network if they so desired. What was in fact seen by the West and conveniently forgotten in the euphoria of victory without loss and the use of air power alone was probably one of the best examples of how to protect critical resources against an enemy of overwhelming air superiority since the Vietnam War era. The main Serbian air defence system comprised a highly professional body equipped with functional but elderly Russian-supplied (and locally modified) SAM weaponry and radars, modern computer networking and communications, considerable built-in system redundancy and using tactics which were originally taught under the former Yugoslavian Communist regime but were designed to defend against both Eastern and Western threats. The Yugoslav army also had in its own right considerable low-level air defences deployed in the Kosovo area. These were of sufficient strength and organisation to force NATO aircraft to operate at medium altitudes for much of the campaign. Thus causing considerable problems to NATO in its target identification, acquisition and weapon launching situations. The low-level systems deployed included considerable numbers of Igla (man-portable SA-18 `Grouse'), Igla-1 (man-portable SA-16 `Gimlet'), Strela-1M (self-propelled SA-9 `Gaskin'), Strela-2M (man-portable SA-7b `Grail'), Strela-2M/A (locally built and modified man-portable SA-7b `Grail'), Strela-3 (man-portable SA-14 `Gremlin'), Strela-10 (self-propelled SA-13 `Gopher'), BOV-3 (self-propelled triple 20 mm), ZSU-57-2 (self-propelled twin 57 mm) and M53/59 (self-propelled twin 30 mm), backed up by mobile batteries of 2K12 Kub (self-propelled SA-6 `Gainful') and 9K33 Osa (self-propelled SA-8 `Gecko') SAMs. Probably one of the most enduring pictures of the Kosovo air campaign for the editors was at the end, when after weeks of continual bombing and daily NATO claims of the air defence network destruction, the Yugoslav army was seen to roll out of Kosovo across the border into Serbia with long lines of intact air defence vehicles." |
- NATO statistics show that a total of 38,004 sorties were flown between 24 March and 10 June, an average sortie-generation rate of 494 missions per day. Of the total, 14,006 were strike and suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) missions (10,808 of which were dedicated strike sorties). In the early days of the campaign, however, the sortie rate over Yugoslavia was more like 150 missions per day.
- NATO restricted the operating height of attack aircraft to a baseline of 15,000ft for much of the war.
- NATO released 23,614 pieces of air munition
- 35% of weapons released was guided
- 329 cruise missiles (BGM-109 T-LAM and AGM-86C CALCM ) were fired
US Navy Admiral James Ellis, the commander-in-chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe warned after the war that, "After 78 days of hard campaigning, we effected little degradation on a modern IADS system."
Yugoslav Third Army (responsible for south-east part of FRY incuding Kosovo and Metohija) losses:
- 161 killed in combat
- 299 wounded
- 13 T-55 tanks destroyed ( 7 by NATO, 6 by KLA)
- 6 APC
- 8 artilery pieces
- 19 AA guns
Air force losses:
- 3 An-2TD
- 1 An-26
- 19 Galeb G-2
- ~ 10 SuperGaleb G-4
- 1 J-22 Orao
- 11 Mig-29
- number of YU Aviation Museum aircraft (3 Mi-14, 2 Ka-25, 1 Mig-21U)
According to a report presented to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) the Yugoslav Air Force lost a total of 50 aircraft
In conclusion
- Yugoslav armed forces performed well above all expectations - VJ managed to control the territory and to defeat OVK in spite of fierce NATO bombings.
- NATO fulfiled its objective, practically without casualties, deploying KFOR forces in Kosovo and Metohija province. VJ and Police forces pulled out, after the Military Technical agreement signed in Kumanovo, when it was recognized by the Yugoslav government that without allies and massive military aid the NATO could not be defatted.
- NATO grossly underestimated VJ at the beginning of their operation - at the end they needed ~80 days (they planed 4-5 days), ~1060 aircraft (they started with 365) flying from 7 counties to bring mater to satisfying solution
- Even older weapon systems (from seventies and eighties) with innovative tactics may be used successfully on modern battelfield.
- Dispersed and well camouflaged troops can stay undetected even for the technically most advanced adversary.
- B-2/JDAM and AWACS/AMRAAM combinations performed as advertised.
- USAF proved that "smart" weapons could minimize civilian casualties if they wish to do so. Unfortunately when they needed to fly low to hit "pin-point" targets pilots, in fear of heat-seeking missiles, stayed above 4000 m and killed many innocent people (UK rushed in operation modified BL755 that could be launched from medium altitude).
- NATO finally suppress VJ medium range SAM's (from seventies) but they had very little success in destroying low-level systems and were forced to commit large numbers of SEAD aircraft at every mission.
- Real-time targeting is still not good enough to provide sufficient targeting and battle-damage assessment information
- NATO intelligence services performance was notoriously bad - they provided maps to bomb Chinese Embassy (if that's really happened), they totally miscalculated situation in Yugoslavia, Information war was a big disappointment (leaflets, TV and Radio programs "we bomb you for your own good" are pathetic).
- NATO proved very effective in disrupting civilian lives and in destroying infrastructure targets.
The NATO briefings did not lie, but they were massive exercises in spin control, carefully tailored facts, and carefully chosen omissions.
Since KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo and Metohija around 250000 non-Albanians were forced to leave their homes and more than 800 were killed
The newest version of this page has large except from the article by Aleksandar Radic and Vladimir Jovanovic, published in Air Forces Monthly April 2002 issue
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